

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: An Objective Analysis of the
Treaty and Its Importance In US-Russian Relations

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Machella Nydia Caldwell

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Faculty Advisor's Approval
Date

Elizabeth Hammond
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Director of the University Honors College Approval
Date

Carolyn R. Thompson
12/09/02

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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States has implemented foreign policy that has had tremendous influence on its relationships with other countries. The Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 was a treaty between the United States and the former Soviet Union that had and continues to have a huge impact on the relationship between the two countries. The main objective of ABM treaty was to place a limit on the number of short and intermediate missiles each country could possess in order to ultimately stop the ongoing arms race. On December 13, 2001, President George Bush declared that within six months the United States would withdraw from the ABM treaty. Bush and his administration stated that various circumstances affecting U.S. national security have changed fundamentally since the signing of the ABM treaty in 1972 (ABM Treaty Fact Sheet). Since the termination of the treaty in June 2002, there has been a concern that the relationship between the United States and Russia has been tainted. The relationship between these countries has not been tainted but is slightly strained. In order to fully understand the relationship between the US and Russia, the following is an objective analysis of the ABM treaty, examining the advantages and disadvantages, the process leading to the elimination of the treaty, and the effect of termination of the treaty on the US-Russian relationship.

II. HISTORY OF THE ABM TREATY

The making of the ABM treaty and the use of nuclear defense resulted from several factors. The beginning of the nuclear age was a direct result of the bombing of Hiroshima in 1945. After the bombing, questions surfaced involving the development of weapons of mass destructions. As a result of the threat of new weapons, a doctrine of sufficiency was applied that stated, "If you could destroy the enemy with x number of bombs, it did not matter if the enemy had 2x and you certainly did not need 3x." (Crabb & Holt 66) Essentially, each country was capable of destroying one another. In the meanwhile, problems surfaced dealing

with the relationship between nuclear and conventional weapons. Eventually the Soviet Union obtained nuclear weapons and as a result a balance of terror occurred. The balance of terror, which is also referred to as Mutual Assurance Destruction or MAD, stated that "each side was able to wreak an unacceptable level of destruction on the other even after absorbing a first strike." (Crabb and Holt, 66) Both sides began to increase the number of powerful weapons they possess. Under MAD there was no effective defense against nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated, that the only means to ensure national security is massive retaliation. (Crabb and Holt, 67)

During the onset of World War II, the United States began to hold a monopoly of nuclear weapons, which in turned, prompted the United Nations to take some action. Bernard Baruch, a financier and advisor to presidents, proposed that

an international authority be created to control production of fissionable material, that there be international licensing and inspection of peaceful nuclear facilities, and that no nation be allowed to possess nuclear weapons or production facilities. (Crabb and Holt, 67)

While this legislation was being proposed the Soviet Union was well on its way to developing nuclear weapons and rejected the US attempt to end the development of these weapons. As a result of the Baruch plan, there were numerous conferences about the nuclear arms race but none seem to solve the problem. Then in 1963 the Limited Test Ban treaty was enacted. The provisions of this treaty included: "Prohibiting testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. Underground tests were also banned if they would vent radioactive debris beyond the national borders." (Crabb and Holt, 67). The main goal of the Limited Test Ban treaty was to protect the environment from radioactive materials. Other treaties began to stem from the Limited Ban treaty in 1967, 1968, and 1971. There was a treaty that banned nuclear weapons in outer space, a nonproliferation treaty stated that nuclear states would not transfer weapons to those countries classified as non-nuclear states and as a result

the non-nuclear states would not acquire nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The seabed arms control treaty, which was an extension of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, sole purpose was to internationalize the Antarctic and ban nuclear weapons from that continent. All of these treaties were well into effect when Senator Eugene J. McCarthy made a key observation stating that measures were being made to ban weapons from outer space, from the ocean floor, and from the Antarctic, places where no one had any intentions of using them, but they were doing nothing to protect those place that might be in harms way. His observation led to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that eventually produced the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. (Crabb and Holt, 67)

Before the United States entered into the ABM treaty, the army had begun a research program, in 1954, on anti-ballistic missile defense, which was to be an extension of its work on anti-aircraft defense. Under Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson they all resisted the program because to them it took up too much of the budget and other issues were more pressing. But when Congress got word, in 1957, that the Soviet Union had acquired intercontinental ballistic missiles, they approved \$137 million more than had been requested for the program. The US finally received word that the Soviet Union was installing an ABM system around Moscow. President Johnson responded to the problem by writing Premier Aleksei Kosygin a letter on January 21, 1967. The letter stated that if the Soviets continued with this project, it would force the United States to "increase in offensive capabilities and thereby ratchet the arms race up another notch." (Crabb and Holt, 68)

The United States began work on an ABM system of its own. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara announced that the United States would begin to deploy a limited ABM system that would not be against the Soviet Union but against China. The Chinese had

possession of nuclear weapons since 1964 and did not seem to be a threat to the US.

McNamara's proposal called the Sentinel had several advantages, it:

- Avoided the prohibitive expense of a nationwide system,
- Avoided the appearance of building toward a first strike capability and
- Gave the impression that the US was 'doing something.' (Crabb and Holt, 69)

Critics of the plan pointed out that the United States was "defending against a threat (from China) that did not yet exist, while ignoring a threat (from the Soviet Union) that did exist."

(Crabb and Holt, 69) Congress first welcomed the Sentinel because they had wanted the Johnson Administration to take some action against the Soviet ABM system. The program was viewed by the Johnson administration as a buffer precisely against a full-blown ABM system. McNamara later commented that his program was aimed at pleasing Congress. The Sentinel program began to cause debates in Congress. There were some who thought the Sentinel should be used as a stepping-stone to a full-blown ABM system, while others did not want the ABM system based on its merits. When Nixon came into office he renamed the McNamara program the Sentinel Safeguard that expanded the mission of the Sentinel to include protect to the US missile sites against both the Soviet and or Chinese attacks) Beginning in 1970, the SALT negotiations began to take place between the US and the Soviet Union concerning the use and development of ABM systems. (Crabb and Holt, 69)

At the beginning of the SALT talks the US wondered if they should use the ABM as a bargaining chip throughout the negotiations. Some political leaders felt that by using the ABM as a bargaining chip that:

It might indeed give the United States greater leverage in negotiations, but acquiring something for the principal purpose of giving it away is expensive; and if the other side recognizes that something is being used as a bargaining chip, the chip's value may substantially decrease, or the other side may come up with a bargaining chip of its own for which it will demand more concessions. (Crabb and Holt, 70)

The end result was that the Nixon Administration's was willing to limit ABMs throughout the negotiation with the Soviet Union. This action was largely induced and influence by Congress and the public's opposition to the ABM system. At times it seemed as though the SALT negotiations were being used only to avoid the possibility of Congress killing the treaty. It was believed that "if Congress had not threaten to kill it, the Nixon administration might not have been willing to give it up-or might have gotten more in return for it." (Crabb and Holt, 71) In actuality the Nixon administration was divided over the ABM system; the Joint Chiefs of Staff were ecstatic with plans of developing the ABM system. In the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency there were some that were lukewarm while others were totally appalled and opposed the ABM. Finally, the intelligence community was baffled by the Soviet program and purpose that it served. (Crabb and Holt, 71)

III. THE CONDITIONS OF THE ABM TREATY

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty or SALT I agreement was entered into by the United States and Soviet Union on October 1972. The stipulations of the treaty set limits on the number and location of anti-ballistic missile systems for the former Soviet Union and the United States. The ABM treaty "limited each party to two ABM systems, one for the national capital and one for a missile base." (Crabb and Holt, 71) The treaty prohibited systems or components that were sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. The treaty also "prohibited testing and development of launchers capable of handling more than one interceptor missile at a time or those with automatic or other rapid-reload capabilities." (Crabb and Holt, 71) The ABM treaty prevented the development of defense against long-range strategic missiles, thus removing one incentive for a nuclear arms race. Other stipulations of the treaty stated that each side must abide by the following:

1. not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country;
2. not to provide a base for such a defense;
3. not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except at one specified site each;
4. not to develop, test, or deploy multiple interception missile launchers or rapid reload capability for ABM launchers;
5. not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems, or components that are sea-based, air-based, space based, or mobile land based;
6. not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or the elements in flight trajectory and not to test them in an ABM mode; and
7. not to transfer to other states nor to deploy outside its national territory ABM systems or their components. (Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) Treaty, 1)

Another aspect of the ABM treaty was the establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission. The purpose of this entity was to respond to questions, problems, or concerns that might arise pertaining to the treaty's provisions. The SCC also promoted and implemented the treaty's main objective of ending the nuclear arm race. (ABM treaty, Article IV) Along with the treaty were seven explanatory statements initialed by Nixon and Brezhnev. Although technically not part of the treaty, these statements carried great weight and added more emphasis and explanation to certain specifications in the treaty. Also "an Interim agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms was signed in Moscow at the same time as the ABM treaty proper." (Crabb and Holt, 72) The provisions under this agreement were that:

- It essentially froze each country's strategic offensive missiles

- No new fixed land based continental ballistic missile launchers were to be started or old ones improved.
(Crabb and Holt, 72)

The Interim Agreement stated that it was to last five years but after the five-year period it continued to be recognized as a standing agreement. The Interim Agreement might have been considered an executive agreement in earlier times but in 1961 Congress created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that

provided for the authorization of legislation that no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the US to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the US except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress. (Crabb and Holt, 73)

The Senate was finally given the treaty on June 13, 1972 with the request for their advise and consent to ratification. With little or no controversy the Senate approved the treaty. Although the Senate approved the treaty

in the defense appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1973, passed in 1972, Congress denied funds for the ABM site allowed to protect Washington. The other site that the treaty allowed, and that the United States had chosen to put at the Safeguard site in North Dakota was about 90 percent complete when the treaty was signed.
(Crabb and Holt, 73)

IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTGES OF THE ABM TREATY

The Anti-Ballistic Treaty, as does any type of foreign policy, had its advantages and disadvantages. While the treaty provided the means to end the ongoing nuclear arms war, the treaty failed to specify or provide for new technology and threats from other countries.

A. Advantages

The initial purpose of the treaty was to prevent a nuclear arms race between the US and the former Soviet Union. In order to keep a watchful eye on nuclear and chemical weapons, the ABM treaty helped to facilitate measures that limited the

amount of nuclear weapons they could possess. One of the main advantages of the treaty was that

When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened hearings on the ABM Treaty in June 1972, most lawmakers and witnesses praised the agreement, negotiated by President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Breshnev, as the best way to put brakes on an accelerating and expensive arms race. (Towell, 4)

John Rhinelanders stated, "The ABM treaty is tied for the foreseeable future to arms control and weapons reduction and it is essential for the United States to abide by it." (Rhinelanders, 1)

The treaty established neutral grounds regarding the development and possession of nuclear weapons. It served as a guideline to alleviate possible nuclear threats among the countries. The treaty was essential because it helped to formulate a dialogue with other countries outside of the US and Russia concerning nuclear development. As a result of this treaty, the US and China have had continuous and effective communication and made efforts to reduce strategic nuclear force.

Besides setting specific guidelines and procedures for the US and Russia to abide by, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was viewed as a flexible agreement. In other words, embedded within the treaty was the opportunity for both sides to compromise and amend various aspects of the treaty. Giving the US and Russia the ability to amend the treaty allowed them to change the stipulations of the treaty that may have been viewed as out of date or even include ways to limit new technological innovations that might cause another arms race. Essentially, the treaty provided a safeguard for the potential dangers of war and chaos among the countries.

B. Disadvantages

Although the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty provided a means to stop the arms war between the US and the former Soviet Union, it failed to establish a means of dealing with future problems that might arise. The main disadvantage was centered on the specific terminology used in the treaty. Within the ABM treaty there were no specific provisions that discussed the advancement of other nuclear systems and weapons. The treaty did allow for amendments to be made that would eventually prohibit other nuclear and destructive weapons to be developed or tested. The treaty not limit weapons such as theater missile defense. The ABM treaty did place limits on the ABM systems that are defined as "strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" but it did not explicitly state or define strategic ballistic missile. (Blackwill, 2) The ABM treaty did not take into consideration the concern for the advancement of new and powerful nuclear systems. As a result it left the lingering question of what actually constitutes a strategic ballistic missile as opposed to the theater ballistic missile.

The founders of the treaty also neglected to guarantee protection against the possible threat of being ambushed by other countries, especially 3rd world countries. The ABM treaty did not provide for the possibility of threats from other countries. The US and the former Soviet Union did not account for new threats of nuclear weapons from countries such as: Iran, Iraq, China, North Korea, and even third world countries. (Miller, 97) Due to the fact that the Cold War is over and the threats of new countries are steadily arising, the government felt the obligation to develop new means of protecting the national security of the country and withdrew from the obsolete Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

V. The Process Leading to the Elimination of the Treaty

A. President Jimmy Carter

The basic argument over the ABM treaty was “essentially over nuclear sufficiency versus nuclear parity or even superiority.” (Crabb and Holt, 73) Further negotiations began to proceed concerning the ABM treaty once President Carter was in office. During his administration the five-year period on the Interim agreement passed, and no new agreement was signed, although both countries still continued to abide by the treaty. As a result of not passing a new agreement the beginnings of the SALT II negotiations took place. On June 18, 1979 the SALT II treaty was signed by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev. It provided for a complicated system of sub limits as well as counting rules, and it also included a statement of principles for SALT III. Carter sent the treaty to the Senate and from there it went through extensive hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee. The question that arose was “Could the United States be sure that the Soviets would comply with this agreement?” (Crabb and Holt, 75) Problems occurred in August of that year when the intelligence agencies reported the unsuspected Soviet presence in Cuba. As time went on the US found out that the Soviets had been there for a number of years. When the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan, in December 1979, it prompted Carter to ask the Senate to suspend consideration of the SALT II treaty and the Senate complied.

B. Reagan Administration and the Strategic Defense Initiative

The issue of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty seem to fade from the “public radar” until President Ronald Reagan took office (Towell, 3). Once President Reagan took office, more questions began to surface concerning the ABM treaty. The anti-missile defense as it evolved into the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) raised the question of how much flexibility the president has in interpreting a treaty after it has been made. President Reagan’s administration implied that the president’s flexibility is virtually unlimited when it comes to interpreting a treaty. On the contrary a majority of the Senate and the House during

Reagan's presidency said that this flexibility was constrained by the Senate's powers. The Strategic Defense Initiative or Star Wars was to "construct a umbrella over the US consisting of a network of space-based and space launched laser and nuclear weapons with the capability of destroying hostile missiles in flight." (Crabb and Holt, 77) President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of 1983 was designed to protect the entire country with missiles and satellite weapons. This proposal caused much controversy because of the escalation in both the cost and technology. The Russians also were opposed to the SDI stating that it would essentially shatter the premise of the ABM treaty (Towell, 4).

The arguments against the SDI were similar to those made years before with respect to the original ABM. It was estimated that in the first five years of the SDI research that it would cost \$22 billion and the deployment would approximately be about \$500 billion or more. Also some legislators wondered if the SDI would inspire the Soviet Union to seek ways to penetrate it and would therefore up the arms war to another level. (Crabb and Holt, 78- 79)

The Soviets were disturbed by the SDI legislation, and US-Soviet negotiations took place between President Gorbachev and President Reagan. The Soviets ask for the SDI to be abandoned or limited and Reagan refused both options. The Reagan administration stated that the SDI was not a bargaining chip. Instead they said that it would fit under the testing and development of ABM systems under the "new physical concepts" that were supposedly approved by the SALT I treaty. (Crabb and Holt, 77) Congress' reaction to the SDI was that it "seeks to establish the validity of the broad interpretation against the day when it would want to conduct tests that were prohibited by the narrow interpretation." (Crabb and Holt, 79) A confrontation began in Congress over the way that the Senators felt about the SDI. Those that supported the reinterpreting of the treaty were for the SDI, and those against the

reinterpretation were against the SDI. Another question that developed as a result of the SDI was the relationship of the Senate and the President in reinterpreting a treaty on a major issue of national defense. A battle over the funding for this program began because Congress could use their power of the purse to stop this legislation. The dispute over the ABM treaty did not end there. It also had some affect on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). This treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev in 1987 was considered to be a landmark in arms control because:

1. It provided for the elimination, as distinguished from the limitation, of a whole class of weapons-in this case, intermediate and shorter-range missiles and launchers;
 2. Introduced the principle of asymmetrical reduction where one party (in this caser the Soviet Union) would give up more than the other party;
 3. It provided for on-site inspections to verify the elimination had in fact occurred..
- (Crabb and Holt, 83-84)

Based entirely on the "common understanding" and "shared interpretation" of their constitutional powers, the Senate did not agree with this treaty. (Crabb and Holt, 85)

C. President George Bush's (Sr.) Administration

President George Bush's' administration added on to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative program. Bush's program entitled the Brilliant Pebbles was a modification of the SDI. Brilliant Pebbles "would be clusters of small rockets in the earth orbit. They would be designed to detect the launch of hostile missiles and to intercept and destroy them by impact." (Crabb and Holt, 85) After the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, the Bush administration found new reasons to proceed with the SDI.

Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina both agreed that the US needed to take some action against a possible threat of "proliferation of ballistic missiles in third world countries." (Crabb and Holt, 85) On the other hand Senator Albert Gore, Jr. argued that the SDI program was an attempt to shift

from a defense plan against the Soviets. Instead, this program was to provide some means of defense against all countries that may pose a threat to the United States. The Persian Gulf War prompted yet more questions concerning the United States defense system. The war “which followed hard on the collapse of Communist power in Europe, raised new questions of a grand strategy” (Crabb and Holt, 88). Those that were once against the SDI agreement stopped arguing over reinterpretation of the ABM treaty and started talking about ways to renegotiate it. A variety of amendments were proposed that would help reallocate monies for the research and development of the SDI. When the time came to vote on this new defense system “some of the votes for the ABM reductions came from people who opposed the ABM while other votes came from people who were perhaps not opposed to ABM at all but simply favored other weapons more strongly.” (Crabb and Holt, 87) It seemed as though the argument over the ABM appeared to be over but appearance can be deceptive.

D. President William Clinton’s Administration Quest to Modify the ABM Treaty

As with his predecessors, President Clinton also dealt with the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty during his administration. Clinton’s involvement in the ABM treaty took on various diplomatic tasks including “stretching the terms of the ABM treaty enough to allow a small-scale, junior “star war defense and persuading both Russia and the Senate to comply with this arrangements” (Towell, 2). During President Clinton’s administration, he actively pursued making modifications to the ABM treaty that would benefit the US and Russia. Edwin Feulner stated that

The treaty’s health improved slightly during the Clinton administration, which saw it as ‘the cornerstone of strategic stability,’ despite the fact that the Soviet Union no longer existed and that a growing number of nuclear nations—China, Iraq, Iran and North Korea, to name just a few—weren’t party to the treaty anyway. (1)

As originally stated

the treaty permitted two strictly limited ABM systems, but the number was reduced to one by subsequent amendment. Each side may erect a single, limited ABM system to protect its capitol or protect one ICBM launch area. As clarified in the subsequent Agreed Statements, interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead are banned. The Treaty provides for a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to promote its objectives and to assist with implementation. Article XIV calls for a review of the Treaty every five years. The United States began testing its first theater missile defense (TMD) system known as Theater High Area Defense (THAAD), interceptor in April 1996. (Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) Treaty, 1)

President Clinton took the initiative to try to develop new defense methods under the ABM treaty. While in office Clinton negotiated amendments with Russia in 1997 to distinguish between the national and regional missile defense weapons, and to extend the treaty to three other former Soviet Union States, but the Senate did not agree with his proposals. During Clinton's Administration he actively worked with the Russia in modifying the treaty and "proposed a missile system with Russian sensitivities in mind" (Lowry, 39). The drama began at the onset of Russia contemplating whether to ratify the 1993 START 2 agreement on strategic nuclear arms reduction and also trying to figure US Congress plans surrounding the ABM treaty. Clinton was influential and successful in the following areas relating to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty:

1. To provide Russia assurance that the United States would not 'break out' from the newly established limits of an ABM treaty amendment, the United States is examining the possibility of additional ABM Treaty verification measures.
 2. June 1999 the United States Congress passed legislation stating that it is the United States Policy to deploy a NMD system against a limited ballistic missile attack as soon as technologically possible.
- (Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) Treaty, 3)

Since the ABM Treaty of 1972 has existed each presidential administration has seemed to have different attitudes towards the treaty. George Bush Jr. had a different approach of dealing the ABM treaty and Russia.

VI. President George Bush and the Inevitable Withdrawal from the Treaty

The perception of the United States national defense and security has changed since the signing of the ABM treaty in 1972. (ABM Treaty Fact Sheet) With these fundamental changes in sight, President George Bush wanted to provide the country with the best defense available. President Bush began his term in office by making an effort to contact Russia's President Vladimir Putin, and they began a series of talks centered on the effectiveness of the treaty for both countries. While the US wanted to withdraw from the treaty, Russia was not in favor of this action. Bush and his supporters believed the ABM treaty to be outdated legislation that was still in existence because the United States felt pressures from Russia to stay committed to a treaty that was not needed. (Feulner, 1) Edwin Feulner stated that

The ABM Treaty is survived by an emerging international consensus that missile defense offers a better way to protect peace and avert nuclear war. Preceding it in death are Brezhnev, the Soviet Union, President Nixon, the Cold War and the outdated thinking on defense issues. (1)

In December 2001, President Bush officially stated that under the provisions of the treaty, "as provided in Article XV, the effective date of withdrawal was to be six months from that date." (ABM Treaty Fact Sheet) The underlying reasons for wanting to withdraw from the treaty included the United States' goal of developing new strategic weapons and a better relationship with Russia. Bush's plan for withdrawing from the treaty included:

- In the inter-related area of offensive nuclear forces, we welcome President Putin's commitment to deep cuts in Russian nuclear forces and reaffirm our own commitment to reduce U.S. nuclear forces, significantly.
- The U.S. looks forward to continued consultations on how to achieve increased transparency and predictability regarding reductions in offensive nuclear forces.

- The United States also plans to discuss with Russia ways to establish regular defense planning talks, to exchange information on strategic force issues, and to deepen cooperation on efforts to prevent and deal with the effects of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (ABM Treaty Fact Sheet).

As with any type of policy there must be some type of consensus between the legislative and executive branch. John Rhinelander in "The ABM Treaty Critical Then and Now" argued that the President must consider other key factors in decisions about foreign policy. He stated that "if the President acts unilaterally and withdraws from the ABM treaty, Congress might refuse to fund NMD (ABM) and space programs proposed by the Executive that would violate the current treaty". (Rhinelander, 4) The fear of withdrawing from the treaty is that the United States is ultimately setting itself up for mass destruction because if it withdraws from the treaty, countries such as Russia and China might view the US as vulnerable and easily accessible to be attack. Many politicians wonder if the "president pulls out of the Treaty and bets on an unproven missile defense, our security will clearly be diminished." (Rhinelander, 4) Instead of taking the radical approach and withdrawing from the treaty, several proposals have been made that focus on modifying the current ABM system and incorporating it into the defenses that accommodate the systems of today. (Blackwill, 2)

As of June of this year, the United States has officially withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Treaty and has ushered in a new era of developing a defense system that will protect the national security of the United States, Russia, and that of their allies. So with the end to the treaty present, President Bush has continued to make a conscious effort to protect the national security of the United States and stated that since "the treaty is now behind us he

has made a commitment to deploy missile defenses as soon as possible to protect against the growing missile threat.”(Boese, 1)

While Russia and other political leaders were against the withdrawal of the treaty, President Bush had an overall objective in mind to provide the best possible defense system for the United States. President Bush believed that with the treaty in effect, the US would not be able to develop new nuclear defenses to protect the country. One of the major advantages of the treaty was that it allowed both sides to build defenses against both short and medium range ballistic missiles. (Boese, 1) According to a statement released by the White House Press Secretary, “Under the terms of the ABM treaty, the United States is prohibited from defending its homeland against missile attack. We are also prohibited from cooperating in developing missile defense against long-range threats with our friends and allies.” (The ABM Fact Sheet) Bush commented on the ABM treaty by stating that

as the events of September 11th made clear, we no longer live in the Cold War World for which the ABM treaty was designed. We now face new threats from terrorists who seek to destroy our civilization by any means available to rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Defending the American people against these threats is my highest priority as commander-in-chief.” (Boese, 2)

The main objective for withdrawing from the ABM treaty is that President Bush wants to make the necessary efforts to provide adequate safety measures for the country that reflect the emergence of new threats and new technological innovations. (ABM Treaty Fact Sheet) The task at hand now for President Bush and his administration is to develop new strategic defense approaches appropriate for the challenges of the 21st century. (New Relationship Between the US and Russia) The provisions of the ABM treaty did not allow or provide for the new threats of biochemical warfare or other weapons of mass destructions. The need to have capable defenses that can warn against a variety of nuclear threats not only

represent the long-term mission of the Bush administration but is an immediate policy priority. (Miller, 96)

VII. United States-Russian Relationship—After the Treaty

For some time there has been some strain on the US-Russian relationship. The uneasy strain between the two countries has precipitated from several factors. The numerous elements that have influenced the countries relationship are the recent spy scandals but most importantly conflict has arisen based on some “suspicious arms length” matters. (Glasser) After President Bush’s inauguration, concerns about the US missile defense plans and proposals concerning NATO enlargement and of Russian arms deals with Iran began to surface. Tensions have steadily been present among US and Russia and with the recent US withdrawal from the ABM treaty this and other matters have only served as precursors for a new nuclear confrontation. The United States and Russia have had an up and down relationship since the beginnings of the Cold War, and now it seems like efforts are being made in which both countries are cooperating with one another to ease the tension and promote international security. (Glasser)

The Cold War was a result of the MAD (mutual assurance deterrence) and the ongoing arms race between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The United States and the former Soviet Union were trying to be competitive in all arenas. This war was precipitated by the space age, the development of nuclear weapons, and each country effort to be seen as a superpower throughout the world. The Cold War was also ushered in by the threats of nuclear destruction from these countries on one another. Thus, the United States and Soviet Union had a hostile and uncooperative relationship during this particular time. The Cold War created uneasiness because there was “the grim premise that neither side would launch a nuclear attack because doing so would result in a counter-attack ensuring the

total destruction of both nations.” (ABM Treaty Fact Sheet) Ultimately, the ABM treaty was a significant agreement that served as the framework for international relations throughout the course of the Second World War.

President Bush’s administration and many others believe that the ABM treaty was a by product of the Cold War and in order to response to the changing times new methods of defense needed to be establish (Blackwill, 2). Some politicians and even Clinton’s Administration argued that the ABM treaty could be modified to reflect the necessary needs of the defense systems today thus there would need to be some type of arrangement with the former Soviet Union that would maintain international stability while allowing the US to advance its defense systems. Joseph Kay stated

The predominant view within American ruling circles at that time—articulated first by President Eisenhower—was that arms control agreements and international institutions such as the United Nations were necessary and positive, from the standpoint of US interests, in a world where the US had to contend with the Soviet Union. (3)

Inevitably, the United States has taking the necessary efforts to withdraw from the treaty and must now prepare to deal with the consequences that may arise from their actions. According to Sir Isaac Newton, “Every action has an equal and opposite reaction.” Newton’s philosophy can be applied in the case of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The action was the United States official withdrawal from the infamous ABM Treaty and as a result the reaction from Russia was essentially nothing.

At this point and time Russia seems to be fully cooperating with the United States decision to withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. One of the underlying reasons that Russia is agreeing with this particular action is due the fact that the countries do not necessarily view one another as a threat. Igor Ivanor stated

After all, the United States and Russia no longer consider each other adversaries, and they face virtually the same threats and challenges, including the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles—the threat cited by Washington to justify deploying an antimissile defense system. Russia is no less interested that the United States is in finding an effective response to this challenge. (1)

As a result of the United States withdrawal from the treaty, Russia has taking some steps to cooperate with other nations beside the United States.

Russia and China, two countries that have had a diminishing relationship in the past, seems to be putting aside their difference. In response to the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, Russia and China signed the Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation treaty. According to Peter Symonds, this treaty was a response to “the global political instability being produced by the increasingly aggressive and unilateral foreign policy of the United States’ administration.” (1) Russian and Chinese officials stated that the agreement does not represent a military alliance but is a statement to the United States that the world can not be dominate by one superpower. These countries also argue that the ABM treaty was the cornerstone to strategic stability throughout the world and that the US has acted too hastily to withdrawal from the treaty. Russia’s President Putin, has continue to state that they oppose US withdrawal from the treaty but they also want to continue the current cooperative relation among the two and develop a new strategic relationship. (Kay, 3)

The United States withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was on Bush’s agenda to help develop and strengthened the national defense system of the United States. Of course it was to no surprise to many of Bush’s open opposition of the treaty. The treaty was once viewed as the strategic cornerstone of defense for the United States and the former Soviet Union. Now the withdrawal from the treaty is “a milestone in the development of American foreign policy and in postwar international relations” (Kay, 1). Bush’s administration has made history in several ways but most importantly, the withdrawal from the ABM treaty marks the first time since the beginning of the nuclear era that the United

States has abandoned a major arms control treaty. The United States action to withdrawal from the treaty was not one made haphazardness. The Bush administration had an agenda that it wanted to accomplish as a result of withdrawing from the agreement.

It was viewed that the withdrawal of the Anti-Ballistic Treaty was well overdo. The treaty that was entered into in 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union has endured drastic changes since the treaty was first signed. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 it has been perceived that Russia, or the former Soviet Union, was no longer a "seriously threatened any longer by the other's strategic nuclear forces" (Blackwill, 2). With the recent terrorist attacks and the threats of small developing countries acquiring weapons of mass destruction Bush plan entails a strategic approach for adopting a defense system capable of providing safety for the United States that was not established within the ABM treaty. According to Steven Miller,

Bush's more enthusiastic and rapid approach, aimed at the eventual deployment of layered defenses, including sea-, air-, and space based components that are incompatible with the treaty, poses an even greater challenge to those who worry about the wisdom of abandoning the ABM Treaty and embarking on the deployment of missile defense. The new terms of the missile-defense debate has been set by the administration. (95-96)

Bush and his administration ultimate goal is to cooperate with Russia fully in providing international security and to deal "with the challenges that calls for the creation of a new strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States and Russia and the world community" (New Relationship Between the U.S. and Russia).

VIII. CONCLUSION

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 was a long-standing agreement between the United States and the former Soviet Union. As times has changed President Bush and his administration felt obligated to provide the United States with an adequate and up to date defense system. The United States withdrawal from the ABM treaty is just one means in

which the government is trying to promote international security and provide protection for the United States. Now it seems as though the United States and Russia are trying to make an effort to work together and display and emphasis their "commitment to advance common values, continue to work together to protect and advance human rights, tolerance, religious freedom, free speech and independent media, economic opportunity, and the rule of law" (New Relationship Between the U.S. and Russia). President Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin pledge that they will represent the best interest and traditions of each country and will focus on the security of these nations now in the near future.

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